CHINA-DJIBOUTI: PLAN'S IOR NAVY 'BASE'
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U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) Commander General David Rodriguez, U.S. Army, confirmed on January 21, 2016, that China has signed a 10-year contract for a military logistics hub in Djibouti. General David Rodriguez said “They are going to build a base in Djibouti, so that will be their first military location in Africa.” China Signpost report #91 reveals that: China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) Tianjin has constructed a salt pier in Djibouti.
China Merchants Holdings (International) (CMHI) holds a 23.5% stake in Port de Djibouti S.A., which includes two-thirds of the port’s Doraleh Container Terminal.
Construction of the Damerjog livestock port and the multipurpose Doraleh port, with both projects launching in 2013, are being funded by China Merchants Group.
China State Construction and Engineering Company (CSCEC) won the bid for the engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) project of Phase I of the Doraleh Wharf in August of 2014, which includes the construction of a 1,200m long frontage for five multi-purpose deep water berths, a 175m long service berth, and related supporting facilities, all in Djibouti.
J. Peter Pham, Director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council, has assessed that the base would be cheaper than China’s current, temporary arrangements that allow for docking ships at Djibouti ports to conduct naval patrols. It would also give China an airfield that could significantly improve its intelligence gathering capabilities over the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Eastern Libya and well into Central Africa.
(Comments: (i) This dovetails into the PLAN's decision to “gradually shift its focus from ‘[near seas] defense’ to the combination of ‘[far seas] defense’ [and] ‘[open ocean] protection.’” Djibouti is also within the un-refueled flight range of an IL-76 or Shaanxi Y-8 maritime patrol aircraft taking off from airbases in southern Xinjiang carrying a 40 tonne payload. The existing port can also accommodate vessels drawing 18 meters, while PLAN's largest ship i.e. the Type 071 LPD, draws seven meters of water. Additionally, PLAN ships and officers are familiar with Djibouti which, in the 78 months of anti-piracy operations off Aden since December 2008, they have visited more than 50 times. China would probably choose Obock, in the northeastern corner of Djibouti as its preferred site since that would give the Chinese military a relatively “exclusive” operating area and secrecy of operations. Pan Chunming, Deputy Director of the Political Division of PLAN's South Sea Fleet (SSF) wrote that “Once we coordinated with a foreign port to berth for three days. However, the port later only allowed us to stay for one day, because a Japanese ship was coming.” Obock's relative isolation and space to accommodate an airfield with large runways would provide a number of other strategic advantages.
(ii) Chinese naval forces have increased their port call tempo across the Indian Ocean region in recent years, visiting Salalah, Oman and Djibouti more than 20 times apiece and visiting Pakistan, Myanmar, Burma, and Singapore multiple times as well. So, with such a plethora of options, why the focus on Djibouti? Below we outline several of the most important factors and offer a map illustrating Djibouti’s proximity to a number of regions that are of rising strategic interest to China.
(iii) To seal matters from the Chinese side, a strong domestic legal framework now sits atop the robust pre-existing diplomatic ties. China’s National People’s Congress in May 2015 laid the foundation for the military to claim that long-range overseas missions are a legally recognized operational mandate. Specifically, Clauses 28 and 30 of the new National Security Law call for the protection of strategic energy supply channels, PRC citizens abroad, and other external interests.
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