He added that according reports including on Chinese social media and overseas newspapers, two CMC members—Fang Fenghui (房峰辉, b. 1952) and Zhang Yang (张阳, b. 1951)—will not be among the delegates to the 19th Party Congress as they are believed to be under investigation for corruption and other transgressions. Several of Fang’s and Zhang’s deputies also failed to serve as delegates, indicating that they are either approaching retirement or facing similar charges of wrongdoing. They include Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department Sun Jianguo (孙建国,b. 1952), who was a candidate for commander of the PLA Navy; Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff Department Wang Guanzhong (王冠中, b. 1953), who served as office director of the CMC and mishu (personal assistant) to former PRC president Yang Shangkun; Deputy Director of the Political Department Jia Ting’an (贾廷安, b. 1952), who was formerly office director of the CMC and mishu to former president Jiang Zemin; and Deputy Director of the Political Department Du Jincai (杜金才, b. 1952), who was, until recently, secretary of the Discipline Inspection Committee of the CMC.

Cheng Li noted that not all of Xi JInping’s protégés in the military have obtained positions as delegates. Pan Liangshi (潘良时, b. 1956), an alternate member of the 18th Central Committee, had been considered a rising star in the PLA. He was appointed by Xi jinping in 2013 to serve as Commander of the Beijing Garrison, and then promoted to Deputy Commander of the Army in 2016. But Pan Liangshi is not among the delegates. Wang Jian (王健, b. 1954), an alternate member of the 18th Central Committee, is a former Deputy Political Commissar of the Beijing Military District. He advanced his career as Political Commissar of the 31st Group Army, which some Chinese analysts refer to as Xi’s “royal army” (近卫军). Wang Jian also served as Deputy Commander of the military parade celebrating the seventieth anniversary of victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan. He retired from the military in 2016. It is not entirely clear why these two protégés retired early. Perhaps Xi intended to show his adherence to certain rules and regulations when it comes to personnel appointments in the PLA. He identified the case of Cai Yingting (蔡英挺, b. 1954) as probably the most intriguing. Cai Yingting’s close association with Xi Jinping began in Fujian, where both worked early in their careers. According to some analysts, Cai Yingting was the first military officer that Xi Jinping promoted after becoming Chairman of the CMC in 2012. Prior to the structural reform of the military, Cai Yingting, a full member of the 18th Central Committee, was considered a leading candidate for Chief of the Joint Staff Department and Member or even Vice Chairman of the next CMC. But in December 2015, Cai Yingting was suddenly transferred from his position as Commander of the Nanjing Military Region to a less-important role as President of the PLA Academy of Military Science. In January 2017, he stepped down from that position. A rumor circulating in the military establishment is that Cai Yingting’s daughter married an American and, thus, CCP regulations prohibited him from being considered for a top military post.

 Among the 83 percent of new delegates to the 19th Central Committee who would probably return in the 19th Party Congress as Full Members of the CCP CC are:

CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang (许其亮, b. 1950); CMC Member and Director of the CMC Armament Department Zhang Youxia (张又侠, b. 1950); CMC Member and Commander of the Rocket Force Wei Fenghe (魏凤和, b. 1954); Commander of the Eastern Theater Command Liu Yuejun (刘粤军, b. 1954); Political Commissar of the Eastern Theater Command Zheng Weiping (郑卫平, b. 1955); Commander of the Western Theater Command Zhao Zongqi (赵宗岐, b. 1955); and Political Commissar of the Southern Theater Command Wei Liang (魏亮, b. 1953). 

Xu Qiliang is also expected to remain a CMC Vice Chairman and Politburo member. Xi Jinping and Xu Qiliang formed a close working relationship in Fujian in 1991, when Xi Jinping was Party Secretary of Fuzhou city and Xu Qiliang served as Commander (军长) of the Air Force stationed in that province. Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia have strong family ties: their fathers, Xu Zhongxun and Zhang Zongxun, were both natives of Shaanxi and were “bloody fighting comrades” during the Communist Revolution. Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia inherited their fathers’ friendship. They both were born in Beijing and grew up around the officers’ “big yards” (干部大院). Zhang Youxia is a leading candidate for a CMC vice chairmanship and another Politburo seat representing the PLA.

According to unverified sources, the CMC formed at the 19th Party Congress may have four Vice Chairmen instead of its current two, and may forego positions at the “member” level. Current CMC member Wei Fenghe will be a strong candidate for a Vice Chairmanship. The other two candidates are Li Zuocheng (李作成, b. 1953) and Miao Hua (苗华, b. 1955), who replaced Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang as Chief of the Joint Staff Department and Director of the Political Department, respectively. Li Zuocheng has long been a highly respected officer. In 1979, he served in the Chinese-Vietnamese War, and the CMC dubbed him a war hero. At the 12th Party Congress in 1982, he served on the presidium (主席团). Only 29 years old at the time, Li was the presidium’s youngest PLA representative and was considered a rising star in the officer corps. However, Li’s career stagnated throughout most of the 1990s, after he offended then Chairman of the CMC Jiang Zemin. It was Xi Jinping who appointed Li Zuocheng to serve as Commander of the PLA Army in 2015 and Chief of the CMC Joint Staff Department in 2017. Xi Jinping also fast-tracked the promotion of Miao Hua, who served as Director of the Political Department of the 31st Group Army in the early 1990s. In just the past three years, Miao Hua has received three promotions: from Political Commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region, to Political Commissar of the Navy, and now Director of the CMC Political Department.

In 2017, Xi Jinping also appointed Han Weiguo (韩卫国, b. 1956), Shen Jinlong (沈金龙, b. 1956) and Ding Laihang (丁来杭, b. 1957) to be Commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively. None of these five newly promoted military leaders currently serve as Full or Alternate members of the 18th Central Committee. Thus, they are known in Chinese as 双非将军 (double-not generals) All of them received two-step “jump promotions” to reach their current positions. Shen Jinlong and Ding Laihang still hold the military rank of Vice Admiral/Lieutenant General rather than Admiral/General, as would usually be the case. These high-ranking officers who were born in the late 1950s—Han Weiguo, Shen Jinlong, Ding Laihang, along with Commander of the Strategic Support Force Gao Jin (高津, b. 1959) and Commander of PAP Wang Ning (王宁, b. 1955), both of whom serve as alternate members of the 18th Central Committee—now form the PLA’s key officer corps, second only to the CMC vice chairs. They are Xi Jinping’s most trusted “young guards” in the military.

In addition to their strong personal ties with—and political loyalty to­—CMC Chairman Xi Jinping, these newly promoted military leaders share three distinct characteristics. First, most joined the PLA at a very young age: Miao Hua and Han Weiguo at the age of 14, Wang Ning at the age of 15, Xu Qiliang at the age of 16, and Li Zuocheng at the age of 17. Second, while they received fast-track promotions in recent years under Xi Jinping, most spent the early portion of their military careers advancing step by step through the military hierarchy. Zhang Youxia and Li Zuocheng gained experience in combat, and Xu Qiliang and Ding Laihang were trained as pilots. Third, most of them are well acquainted with new trends in modern warfare and the movement toward joint operations. Several served as presidents of military academies. For example, Sun Jinlong served as president of both the Dalian Naval Academy and the PLA Naval Command College. Ding Laihang served as president of the Air Force Command College. Gao Jin was once the youngest-ever president of the PLA Academy of Military Science.These shared characteristics of the PLA’s top officer corps seem to align with Xi Jinping’s pronounced goal of transforming China’s military operations from a Soviet-style, army-centric system toward what analysts call a “Western-style joint command.”  Xi Jinping appears to be firmly in control of the PLA, reflecting the successful reassertion of civilian command over the military under his leadership.