1. Major changes in the international geo-political landscape, anticipated since the global economic downturn in 2008, are now beginning to occur. The Sino-US relationship, one of the world’s most important in the past nearly four decades, is undergoing fundamental change with US President Donald Trump translating into action the apprehensions of the US establishment about China’s rise and potential challenge to US primacy. He is the first US President since Nixon to begin altering the nature of US relations with China.

2. By initiating the so-called ‘Trade War’ with China this April, Trump has effectively put China on notice. Chinese analysts and strategic experts have been quick to assess -- quite correctly -- that the trade war is actually a bid to ‘contain’ China’s rise. Many Chinese analysts have harboured suspicions about Trump’s true attitude towards China ever since his precedent-breaking telephone conversation with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in December 2017. Shi Yinhong, Professor of International Relations at Renmin University in Beijing, at that time promptly asserted “the US President-elect hates China and will encourage Tsai to resist pressure from the mainland.”

3. On September 17, 2018 President Trump announced he will impose tariffs on an additional $ 200 billion of imports from China. The new round of tariffs took effect from September 24 at a 10 percent rate. The rate jumps to 25 percent on January 1, 2019. The announcement surprised observers who thought Trump would wait till Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce Wang Shouwen and the US Treasury Department’s Under Secretary for International Affairs, David Malpass conclude negotiations in Washington. Chinese Vice Premier Liu He had also been invited for talks which were scheduled for September 27 or 28. Punitive tariffs contemplated by US President Trump so far total nearly $ 500 billion.

4. This so-called ‘trade war’ between the US and China initiated by US President Donald Trump coincides with the perceptible slowing down of China’s economy -- the Shanghai market is down roughly 23 percent in dollar terms so far this year --and puts Chinese President Xi Jinping under increasing pressure as it shows no signs of easing since it began in April 2018. There is additionally indication of inflation, but despite that Beijing has been printing money thereby possibly aggravating the problem. In the first two weeks of September, the People’s Bank of China injected approximately $90 billion Renminbi (RMB) into the economy. The slowing down of China’s economy would be particularly troubling for the CCP leadership as it could trigger an eruption of demonstrations and protests by a disgruntled populace and spell difficult times ahead for Xi Jinping.
5. Adding to this pressure is the definitive push back on Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by a growing number of countries. Germany, France, Britain, the European Union, Australia, Japan and Canada have also intervened to stop Chinese companies from purchasing technology and hi-tech companies. On August 1, the US Congress increased pressure on China and the US Senate passed a defence-policy bill to make national-security reviews of Chinese deals in the US by the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment, more stringent. Export controls governing which US technologies can be sent abroad have been revamped. One provision of the bill requires an annual report on China to include information on efforts by the Chinese government to influence US media and cultural institutions. China’s official news agency Xinhua and state-owned television CGTN have been asked to register themselves as ‘Foreign Agents’. The bill additionally limits Chinese funding of language programs at US universities, restricts Chinese involvement in joint military exercises and calls for bolstering US ties with India and Taiwan.

6. Chinese intellectuals and academics, including from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s prestigious Central Party School in Beijing, have since last year been warning that China should tone down its aggressive rhetoric and not have an exaggerated sense of its economic or military strength. In September 2017, Luo Jianbo, Head of the China Foreign Policy Center at the Central Party School, cautioned against over-estimating China’s strength and said the people need to guard against "arrogance" and "conceit". He made particular mention in this context of the nationalist fervor generated by the Belt and Road Initiative and the BRI Forum in April 2017. They recommended that Beijing revise its assertive foreign policy and avoid the risk of over-reach.

7. Earlier, after the US announced tariffs on an additional $16 billion worth of Chinese goods in late August, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced that China has filed a complaint with the WTO against the US levies. Bai Ming, Deputy Director of the Ministry of Commerce’s International Market Research Institute said “Launching the complaint against the US at the WTO can help China gain legitimacy for its retaliation and win sympathy from other countries.” Trump’s recent announcement that the US could quit the WTO, however, has the potential to deprive China of a possible neutral interlocutor in the dispute. The Chinese government on September 18, announced it would impose tariffs on US goods worth $60 billion following the Trump Administration’s announcement that it was hitting $200 billion worth of Chinese goods with new tariffs. It said China’s new tariffs will be levied at rates of 5% or 10%, depending on the product and affect more than 5,000 US goods including meat, nuts, alcoholic drinks, chemicals, clothes, machinery, furniture and auto parts.

8. China’s reaction to US actions were initially unusually temperate, but became sharper later. Since the US first decided to impose tariffs on US$ 34 billion worth of Chinese exports on July 6, the CCP’s official newspaper ‘People’s Daily’ published seven commentaries on the ‘Trade War’. In keeping with the CCP Central Committee (CC)’s directive of early June, none of them were belligerent and sought instead to portray China as the ‘wronged’ party. The first commentary cautioned that US “bullying, rude and unreasonable acts” will have “disastrous consequences that harm the interests of Chinese and American companies and people, seriously threaten global free trade and the multilateral system, and impede the advancement of the world economy’s recovery”. The
second said “some people openly ignore the overwhelmingly obvious truth that a ‘trade war is a double-edged sword.’” Another commentary argued that “America’s ‘zero-sum theory of trade,’ violation of rules, and going against trends not only attacks China-US trade cooperation but also brings great uncertainty to the entire world economy.” It said “The history of international trade has repeatedly proven unilateral protectionism is a zero-sum game and whoever plays it will have bad luck”. The fourth asserted that the only aim of America’s talk about “so-called ‘fair trade’ is to have every country of the world pay the bill for US global hegemony”. The fifth commentary warned there is a “danger of making the normal world trade structure slip into the ‘Cold War trap’ of trade protectionism and unilateralism”. The sixth commentary was published after Trump threatened on July 10, to impose tariffs on an additional $200 billion worth of Chinese exports. It vowed to work with the international community to “jointly defend the rules of free trade and the multilateral trade system and fight back against US trade bullying”. The final commentary said US actions hurt the world economy, American people, and China’s poor. It stressed that “the US does not have the right to make a ‘recessionary trap’ for the world.”

9. By August, though, the Chinese official media had begun to escalate the level of rhetoric. On August 6, 2018, the People’s Daily Foreign Edition launched an attack against US President Trump’s trade policy using the Wang Hailou column, an important column directed at members of the Chinese diaspora. Written by a senior editor for the newspaper, Hu Jihong, the article criticized the logic of Trump’s foreign policy. Hu Jihong summarised it as based on the belief that “the US has taken on too many responsibilities and all countries across the world are taking advantage of the US.” He explained that Trump has chosen the most “simple and crude” way to revitalise the US economy and had bypassed the WTO. Stating that Trump’s aim is to “force China to make major concessions at the negotiating table,” Hu Jihong said “if Mr. Trump is familiar with modern and contemporary Chinese history, then he cannot be unaware: in matters of national interest and national dignity, China will absolutely not accept blackmail. It will stand upright and respond.” He described Trump’s effort as “wishful thinking.”

10. Separately, the official ‘Global Times’ said, after Trump threatened an additional $267 billion in tariffs, “We are looking forward to a more beautiful counter-attack and will keep increasing the pain felt by the US”. Beijing’s Ministry of Commerce on August 18, warned of “synchronized countermeasures.” A day earlier the US White House cautioned that “If China takes retaliatory action against our farmers or other industries, we will immediately pursue phase three, which is tariffs on approximately $267 billion of additional imports.” US President Trump had said days earlier that the $267 billion of tariffs is ready to be announced.

11. Consensus in China has simultaneously coalesced around the view that the trade war camouflages the real US agenda of severely retarding China’s rise. There are indications that China’s leadership is preparing to contend with an altered, more competitive if not confrontational, relationship with the US. The latest issue of Qiushi (Seeking Truth), the CCPCC’s authoritative theoretical journal, carried a lengthy commentary defending China’s economic system and asserting that America’s real goal in launching the trade war is to thwart China’s rise. In another commentary in the People’s Daily on August 26, Long Guoqiang, Vice President of the PRC State Council’s in-house think tank, the Development
Research Center, said he expects “deep structural change” in the relationship between the US and China after the trade war, with the US treating China as a key rival. He added “The trade war is not just a measure for the US to gain more economic benefits, it is also an important strategy to contain China.” He advocated that China should not engage in angry rhetoric, but continue to match the US action for action while being ready to resume negotiations any time. Long Guoqiang recommended that in the short-term the government should offer assistance to companies hit by the tariffs and help find new markets for exporters and substitute sources for imports. He said China should not make the same mistakes as the Soviet Union and must not abandon the domestic agenda.

12. Important is the article written in April 2018 by Yuan Peng, Vice President of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), which stated that a fundamental structural change in the Sino-US relationship is taking place. The China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), incidentally, is the think-tank of China’s Ministry of State Security which is responsible for foreign intelligence. Yuan Peng described the ongoing trade war as the first serious clash between China and the US. He noted that unlike on previous occasions this time the political, commercial, academic and military – in other words the entire American society – is involved, with the US government taking the lead. Again, unlike in the past, this time there is no voice supporting China. He attributed this to the view in the US today that China is a competitor in all respects and that China and the US are competing not only in the Asia-Pacific region but also globally. He pinpointed the launch of “One Belt and One Road” and the Djibouti Safeguard Base project as the triggers that convinced the US that China is a global opponent. Observing that today the US and China have no common enemies like the Soviet Union or Osama Bin Laden, Yuan Peng cautioned that the Sino-US bilateral relationship will be impacted by third parties and be constrained by the issues in North Korea, Japan, India, Ukraine, and Iran. Conflicts between China and US and these countries, he assessed, will without exception ultimately become conflicts between China and the US.

13. Crucial to the trade war is the ‘Made in China - 2025’ programme representing the CCP leadership’s declared effort to make China a hi-technology power on par with the world’s most advanced nations by 2025. The technology sector is critical to China’s emergence as a major world power. The prohibition on the fast-growing Chinese telecom company ZTE, which has substantive investments from China’s defence State-owned Enterprises (SoEs) and is closely tied to China’s security apparatus, from doing business in the US was clear indication that China’s technology sector would be targeted. The ban and punitive fines crippled ZTE, which is dependent on purchase of micro-chips and semiconductors from the US and brought home to Chinese leaders their vulnerabilities, especially dependence on foreign semiconductors. Dong Yunting, Director of the Expert Committee at the China Information Technology Industry Federation, reacted quickly saying that the semiconductor industry cannot be restricted to national boundaries. Arguing that "There are hundreds of semiconductor components, and ... no country can do them all", he recommended that the “industry must be globalized." The US action has brought home to Beijing that other countries too can use trade and exports as weapons!

14. This was soon followed by the US decision in August to levy punitive tariffs on 44 Chinese military companies and entities (list at Appendix), which will hit China’s ambitions
hard because these conglomerates are the leaders in development of new military products. In fact, 4,038 patents were declassified to aid military-civilian integration as soon as the trade war started in April. Among the military entities are eight companies and dozens of their subsidiaries including: China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation Second Academy (a research unit of the largest missile systems developer in China); communications system manufacturer Hebei Far East Communication System Engineering; the state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC) which develops semiconductors, radar technology and microelectronic devices; China Volant Industry, which exports and imports aerospace technologies; and China Hi-Tech Industry Import and Export Corporation. The ‘Entity List’ clarifies that it identifies entities reasonably believed to be involved, or to pose a significant risk of being or becoming involved, in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.” There was immediate reaction in the markets with share prices for businesses related to those on the export control list plummeting downwards. GCI Science & Technology, the parent company of Hebei Far East Communications and Glarun Technology, a subsidiary of CETC, dropped over 7 per cent on the Shenzhen exchange and 6 per cent on the Shanghai markets respectively.

15. On September 20, the US sanctioned Russia’s Rosoboronexport and the Chinese military’s Equipment Development Department. Though US officials clarified that Russia was the target, it would not have been lost on the Chinese, who are dependent on Russia for military technology and hardware, that they are dangerously close to US ‘red lines’. China’s response was swift. It recalled People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Commander Vice Admiral Shen Jinlong who was visiting the US, deferred a meeting on joint staff communications scheduled for September and gave a demarche to the US Ambassador.

16. Meanwhile, US Administration officials are expressing confidence that they have the stronger hand because the US economy is picking up while China’s is slowing down and China is more dependent on trade than the US. The trade war between the US and China is unlikely to ease anytime soon unless Beijing, in what would be a very surprising move, decides to capitulate. Such a decision will greatly diminish Xi Jinping’s personal standing.

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(The author is a former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India and is presently President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy.)
China
(1) China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation Second Academy, a.k.a., the following eight aliases, and thirteen subordinate institutions:
—China Changfeng Mechanics and Electronics Technology Academy;
—China Chang Feng Mechano-Electronic Engineering Academy;
—CASIC Second Academy;
—China Chang Feng Mechano-Electronic Engineering Company;
—CASIC Academy of Defense Technology;
—Second Research Academy of CASIC;
—Changfeng Electromechanical Technology Design Institute; and
—China Chang Feng Mechanics and Electronics Technology Academy.

Subordinate Institution
Second Design Department, a.k.a., the following two aliases:
—Beijing Institute of Electronics Systems Engineering; and
—Second Planning Department.

Subordinate Institution
23rd Research Institute, a.k.a., the following two aliases:
—Beijing Institute of Radio Measurement; and
—BIRM.

Subordinate Institution
25th Research Institute, a.k.a., the following one alias:
—Beijing Institute of Remote Sensing Equipment.

Subordinate Institution
201 Research Institute, a.k.a., the following one alias:
—Aerospace Science and Technology Defense Technology Research and Experimental Center.

Subordinate Institution
203rd Research Institute, a.k.a., the following two aliases:
—Beijing Radio Measurement and Testing Institute; and
—Beijing Institute of Radio Metrology and Measurement.

Subordinate Institution
204th Research Institute, a.k.a., the following two aliases:
—Beijing Institute of Computer Applications and Simulation Technology; and
—706th Research Institute.

Subordinate Institution
206th Research Institute, a.k.a., the following two aliases:
—Beijing Institute of Mechanical Equipment; and
—Beijing Institute of Machinery and Equipment.
Subordinate Institution
207th Research Institute, a.k.a., the following three aliases:
—Beijing Guangda Optoelectronics;
—Beijing Institute of Environmental Features; and
—Beijing Institute of Environmental Characteristics.

Subordinate Institution
208th Research Institute, a.k.a., the following one alias:
—Beijing Electronic Document Service Center.

Subordinate Institution
210th Research Institute, a.k.a., the following one alias:
—Xian Changfeng Electromechanical Institute.

Subordinate Institution
283 Factory, a.k.a., the following one alias:
—Beijing Xinfeng Machinery Factory.

Subordinate Institution
284 Factory, a.k.a., the following two aliases:
—Beijing Changfeng Machinery Factory; and
—Beijing Changfeng Xinlian Project Management.

Subordinate Institution
699 Factory, a.k.a., the following one alias:
—Beijing Xinli Machinery Factory.

The following addresses apply to the entity and to the thirteen subordinate institutions:
50 Yongding Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China; and 51 Yongding Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China; and 52 Yongding Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China; and 58 Yongding Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China; and 90 Dianzi Road, Section One, Xian, China.

(2) China Electronics Technology Group Corporation 13th Research Institute (CETC 13), a.k.a., the following six aliases, and twelve subordinate institutions:
—Hebei Semiconductor Research Institute;
—HSRI;
—Hebei Institute of Semiconductors;
—Hebei Semiconductor Institute;
—Hebei Semiconductor; and
—CETC Research Institute 13.
113 Hezuo Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Street, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 90 Dianzi Road, Section One, Xian, China.

Subordinate Institution
Bowei Integrated Circuits, a.k.a., the following three aliases:
—Hebei Bowei Integrated;
—Hebei Bowei Technology; and
—Shijuang Bowei.
113 Hezuo Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Street, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and Shijiazhuang New and Hi-Tech Dev Zone, Hebei, China.

Subordinate Institution
Envoltek, a.k.a., the following one alias:
—Hebei Envoltek Electronics.
21 Changsheng Street, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China.

Subordinate Institution
Hebei Sinopack Electronics, a.k.a., the following one alias:
—Hebei Sinapack Elec.
113 Hezuo Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Street, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China.

Subordinate Institution
Hebei Brightway International,
21 Changsheng Street, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China.

Subordinate Institution
Hebei Medicines Health,
113 Hezuo Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China.

Subordinate Institution
Hebei Poshing Electronics, a.k.a., the following three aliases:
—Hebei Poshin Electronics;
—Hebei Poshing Elec.; and
—Hubei PoshingElectronics.
113 Hezuo Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Street, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China.

Subordinate Institution
Hebei Puxing Electronic,
113 Hezuo Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Street, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China.

Subordinate Institution
Micro Electronic Technology, a.k.a., the following three aliases:
—Micro Electronic Technology Development Application Corp;
—METDA;
—METDAC.
113 Hezuo Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China.
Subordinate Institution
Shijiazhuang Development Zone Maiteda Microelectronics Technology Development and Application Corporation,
21 Changsheng Street, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China.

Subordinate Institution
MT Microsystems,
113 Hezuo Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China.

Subordinate Institution
North China Integrated Circuit Corporation,
21 Changsheng Street, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 113 Hezuo Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China.

Subordinate Institution
Tonghui Electronics, a.k.a., the following one alias:
—Tonghui Electronics Technology.
21 Changsheng Street, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China;

(3) China Electronics Technology Group Corporation 14th Research Institute (CETC 14), a.k.a., the following seven aliases, and two subordinate institutions:
—Nanjing Research Institute of Electronics Technology;
—NRIET;
—Nanjing Electronics Technology Institute;
—Ministry of Information Industry Electronics;
—No 14 Research Institute;
—Research Institute 14; and
—CETC Research Institute 14.

Subordinate Institution
Nanjing SunSea Industry Corporation.

Subordinate Institution
Nanjing Institute of Radio Technology,
The following addresses apply to the entity and to the two subordinate institutions:
No 1 Dinghuaimen, Nanjing, China; and No 8 Guorui Road, Yuhua District, Nanjing, China; and No 4 Guping Gang, Nanjing, China; and 52 Huju Road, North, Nanjing, China;

(4) China Electronics Technology Group Corporation 38th Research Institute (CETC 38), a.k.a., the following seven aliases, and seven subordinate institutions:
—Hefei Institute of Electronic Engineering;
—Southwest China Research Institute of Radar Technology;
—East China Research Institute of Electronic Engineering;
—ECRIEE;
—No 38 Research Institute;
—Research Institute 38; and
Subordinate Institution
Anhui Sun-Create Electronics.

Subordinate Institution
Anhui Bowei Chang An Electronics.

Subordinate Institution
ECU Electronic Industrial.

Subordinate Institution
Hefei ECU-TAMURA Electric.

Subordinate Institution
Anhui Bowei Guangcheng Information Technology.

Subordinate Institution
Anhui Bowei Ruida Electronics Technology.

Subordinate Institution
Brainware Terahertz.

The following addresses apply to the entity and to the seven subordinate institutions:
199 Xiangzhang Ave, Hefei, Anhui, China; and 19 He Huan Lu, Hefei, China; and 19 Hehuan Road, Hefei, China; and 418 Guilin Road, Shanghai, China; and 260 Ji Xi Road, Hefei, China; and 88 Pihe Road, Hefei, China; and Forward Road, Economics Development Zone of Luan, Luan, Anhui, China;

(5) China Electronics Technology Group Corporation 55th Research Institute (CETC 55), a.k.a., the following four aliases, and two subordinate institutions:
—Nanjing Electronic Devices Institute;
—CETC Research Institute 55;
—NEDI; and
—NEDTEK.
524 Zhongshan East Road, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China; and 524 East Zhongshan Road, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China; and 523 East Zhongshang Road, Nanjing, China; and 166 Middle Zhenghang Road, Nanjing, China; and 166 Zhengfang Mid Road, Nanjing, China; and 166 Zhengfand Mid Road, Nanjing, China; and Huaxia Sci and Tech Park Hi-Tech Development, Nanjing, China; and RM 2105 Huaxia Bldg, No 81 Zhongshan Rd, Nanjing, China; and 8 Xingwen Road, Economic and Tech, Nanjing, China.

Subordinate Institution
Nanjing Guosheng Electronics,
8 Xingwen Road, Economic and Tech, Nanjing, China; and 166 Middle Zhongshan Road, Nanjing, China; and 166 Zhengfang Mid Road, Nanjing, China; and 166 Zhengfand Mid Road, Nanjing, China; and 168 Zhengfand Mid Road, Nanjing, China; and 165 Zhangfang Mid-Road, Nanjing, China; and 414 South Zhong Shan Road, Nanjing, Jiangsu, China.
Subordinate Institution
Nanjing Guobo Electronic,
166 Zhengfang Mid Road, Nanjing, China;

(6) China Tech Hi Industry Import and Export Corporation, a.k.a., the following two aliases:
—CTHC; and
—Tianhang Industry Import and Export Company.
30 Haidian Road, Beijing, China; and No A 16 Zao Jun Miao, Haidian, Beijing, China;

(7) China Volant Industry, a.k.a., the following two aliases:
—Volinco; and
—China Huateng Industry.
30 Haidian Road, Beijing, China; and Room 703, 7th Floor, Building 1, No 11, Changchunqiao Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China; and

(8) Hebei Far East Communication System Engineering, a.k.a., the following two aliases:
—Hebei Far East Comm.; and
—HBFEC.
21 Changsheng Street, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 21 Changsheng Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China; and 589 West Zhongshan Road, Shijiazhuang, Hebei, China.

Modifications to the Entity List
This final rule implements a decision of the ERC to modify one existing entry on the Entity List. The ERC made a determination to revise one entry under the destination of China by adding three additional aliases and five additional addresses to the entry for Chengdu GaStone Technology Co., Ltd. (CGTC), for a total of four aliases and nine addresses.

This final rule revises one entry on the Entity List to make the modifications described above:
(1) Chengdu GaStone Technology Co., Ltd. (CGTC), a.k.a., the following four aliases:
—Chengdu Jiashi Technology Co.;
—Chengdu HiWafer Semiconductor;
—Chengdu Haiwei Technology; and
—Chengdu Zenith.
31F, A Tower, Yanlord Square, No. 1, Section 2, Renmind South Road, Chengdu China; and Internet of Things Industrial Park Economic Development District Xinan Hangkonggang (Southwest Airport), Shuangliu County, Chengdu; and 29th Floor, Yanlord Landmark, No. 1 Renmin South Road Section 2, Chengdu; and 29/F Yanlord Landmark Tower A, Chengdu, China; and Union Road, No 88 Internet of Things Industrial, Chengdu, China; and No 88 Wulian Road, Southwest Airp Development Zone, Chengdu, China; and Industrial Park of Internet of Thing SW Airport Eco Dev Zone, Chengdu, China; and Internet Things of Industrial Pa Southwest Airport Economic, Chengdu, China; and The Industrial Park of Internet of Things, Southwest Airport Economic Development Zone, Chengdu, China.